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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was writer as part of the MSc in Accounting, Auditing & Financial 
Management at International Hellenic University. 
This study was designed to examine the effect that the financial and economic crisis 
have on the audit fees of banks located in PIIGCS (i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Cyprus and Spain) countries. Prior research had focused either generally in the banking 
sector or specified in solely cases, such as a unique nation. Furthermore, there are not 
many studies that observe the movements and the behavior of the audit fees. This 
study, using statistical models that involve major determinants of audit fees, is 
valuable since it will provide academia with results that concern those European 
countries that had been affected the most from the current financial distress, meaning 
all PIIGCS countries. A standard audit fee model, modified accordingly so it is 
appropriate for the purposes of this research, is used to investigate the existence of an 
actual difference in the audit fee behavior of 91 EU banks during the crisis. Multiple 
OLS regression has been used as the solely estimation technique on the panel data 
collected from Thomson One database for period 2008-2016. Our model reports that 
there is no actual difference if a bank belongs to a PIIGCS country or elsewhere and 
also that the auditor’s size does matter. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Auditing is considered a most significant service for all kind of firms, including financial 
institutions, due to the fact that it provides them security. In other words, “auditing is 
valued for its ability to provide independent assurance of the credibility of accounting 
information, which improves resource allocation and contracting efficiency ‘’ (DeFond 
& Zhang, 2014). The continuously upward trend of business transactions’ complexity 
and the stricter regulation makes external auditing even more valuable. Creditors, 
clients, the State and all potential related parties trust businesses that are subject to 
high quality external audit way better than those which do not act similarly.  Summing 
up, audit quality is considered very important since it not only boosts up the 
creditworthiness of a company but also adds extra value to the company.  
A basic measure of audit quality is whether a firm incorporates one of the Big 4 audit 
firms to manage its external auditing. Evidence resulting from major studies state that 
companies usually pay an extra amount of fees when they use Big 4 firms as their 
auditors. However, it is still unclear if this extra amount of money constitutes an 
indication of audit quality. Audit fees got increased due to the additional regulation 
imposed currently, like SOX. For some this increase of fees might indicate better audit 
quality however the effort that is required in order, for a firm, to conform to the new 
regulation might not (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
In this research paper, we examine if audit fees are affected by external conditions, 
such as macroeconomic changes. Specifically, we intend to examine if financial crisis 
had an effect on audit fees.  The international economic crisis resulted in the attitude 
that clients demanding lower audit fees at least for years 2008 and 2009 (Krishnan & 
Zhang, 2014). Hence, in order to make our survey more specific, we are dealing 
exclusively with banks. There are quite a few studies that deal with audit fees and 
various aspects that are related with them, yet the majority of them excludes the 
banking sector and that is a main contribution of our research. There are only few 
papers that deal generally with US or EU banks or even with banks from a specific 
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country. So far, studies show that both the financial reporting quality and the audit 
quality of banks were in doubt due to the current crisis (Sikka, 2009), which revealed 
various weaknesses and threats in major financial institutions. Consequently, 
economic crisis was the basis for bankers and regulators to realize that there is an 
immediate need for better and more appropriate regulations and simultaneously, for 
stricter requirements in the banking sector. It is now obvious that corporate 
governance, risk management, control procedures and consequently auditing, should 
be enhanced and improved in an attempt to reduce risk and uncertainty levels. 
Regulatory authorities took advantage of the aforementioned situation and managed 
to set further law and higher requirements. Banks all over the world have to conform 
to certain requirements and regulations regarding their operations and the 
information they provide to third parties (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
March 2014). In EU, the European Banking Authority released Basel III, where all the 
new standards can be found. Basel III is a set of reform measures, developed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to strengthen the existed regulation, risk 
management and supervision in the banking sector (Bank for International 
Settlements). Simultaneously, the urge for better external auditing procedures became 
clear.  
In our research, we attempt to examine if and if yes then how, audit fees have changed 
during the financial crisis as far as banks located in PIIGCS countries are concerned. As 
PIIGCS countries we refer to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain. 
Obviously, it has to do with the countries that suffered the most due to the financial 
crisis. These countries were affected more than the rest all over Europe and we believe 
that it is worth examining separately the effects on their banks’ audit fees mainly 
because the macroeconomic conditions and the risks were remarkably different than 
the rest countries.  
 In general, a widespread belief is that the financial sector was the main driver of this 
economic distress. Basically, banks overused capital, since their cash outflows 
exceeded their real capital belongings something that eventually resulted in 
imbalances which of course led to the crisis. It goes without saying that these countries 
did not respect the fiscal rules of the European Monetary Union and the European 
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Central Bank. We should consider the extremely high bad debt levels of banks located 
in Greece to easily justify the above statement. Moreover, taking into consideration 
statistical results, which we obtained from the European Central Bank, private debt 
during the first seven years after the European Monetary Union increased in Greece 
(217%), Ireland (101%), Spain (75,2%) and Portugal (49%), meaning PIIGCS. However, it 
worth stating that public debt began to follow an upward trend on these countries 
only after and during the financial crisis something that leads us to the conclusion that 
the EMU was not the problem but instead, the management of private sector’s capital 
was.  
Hence, we examine if the risk that these countries entail on their banking sector along 
with the necessity for further and more intense external auditing had an impact on 
audit fees. Do audit firms charge banks with higher risk more during the crisis or do 
they conform to the macroeconomic environment, meaning succumb to the 
commercial reality and prefer to keep the clients even with higher risk? We focus on 
PIIGCS countries because as mentioned above these countries had the major problems 
and beside them the financial crisis occurred like a domino. It is then reasonable, that 
these banks have higher risk levels than the rest and most healthy banks. But can we 
assume that the higher the risk the higher the audit fees? So far, the vast majority of 
studies that deal with audit services, focused exclusively on commercial companies 
excluding the banking sector. There are plenty of studies either for the USA market or 
the EU but there is no study that examines the effect that crisis had on the 
unhealthiest European Banks and their audit fees. Audit procedures were not efficient 
enough prior to crisis and basically that was the case in PIIGCS’ banks, so it does make 
sense to study what happened to those countries audit fees after crisis, knowing that 
regulatory changes have been mandated.  
Thus, this study will contribute to literature; because it will examine how audit fees are 
affected by the basic determinants of audit fees along with extreme levels of standard 
macroeconomic controls in the banks of countries that financial crisis spread the most.  
A standard audit fee model with the appropriate adjustments is implemented in order 
to investigate the exact effect of applicable measures within an economic distress 
environment on audit fees of 91 banks. 
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Our main results are in compliance with prior research findings. In particular, we 
concluded that there is no actual and significant difference in the effects that the 
financial crisis had to PIIGCS’ banks than banks in rest European countries.  What is 
more, also our research concluded that determinants such as the quality of the audit 
firm, meaning if it is a Big 4 or not, is very significant for the amount of fees being 
charged.  
This study is structured as follows: in section two the literature and related 
background is presented, in section three the research methodology and the results of 
the data analysis and in section four we complete our paper with the concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Literature and related prior background 
 
In the current financial crisis, quite a few major global financial institutions bankrupt, 
something that made people question themselves, why the auditors of those entities 
haven’t warned them in advance. Did auditors failed to reach a relevant judgment in 
the audit report due to significant audit risks (Bajaj & Creswell, 2008; Richard 2008; 
Sikka 2009; IAG 2011) or was it the case that the applicable accounting standards 
restricted auditors’ activity in such a way that they could not publicly inform 
institutions accordingly, even though they did realize the financial difficulties (CAQ 
2010; Seidman 2011; Doty 2011). There are studies that present results in favor of 
both perspectives. Doogar, Rowe and Sivadasan (2015) in their research, on which of 
the above two alternatives is more realistic, found that the lack of warning from 
auditors a priori during 2008-2009, that is exactly the leading-up period before the 
global financial crisis, is more likely to stem from the limitations of the applicable 
regulation rather than from the auditors’ incapability to react to systemic risks. Their 
findings are also evidence that audit fees are highly linked and driven by the above 
implied audit risks as well as by charge-offs, investment risks as well as distribution 
support risks.   
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As mentioned above, during the crisis and basically at its very first years, people tried 
to understand whether or not auditors could respond to the escalating 
macroeconomic shocks and consequently, manage to comprehend and forecast well in 
advance the deteriorating financial situation of all those banks that collapsed.  Did they 
know that the bubble was about to explode or had they not even realized it?  
Then, studies focused on the main drivers of audit fees during these macroeconomic 
shifts. Again, studies, as that of Hill et al.  (1994), found that audit fees and hence, 
audit attention are affected by cross-sectional changes and audit risk. Our study differs 
in a way that it does not study U.S banks but rather PIIGCS’ banks and basically if, and 
if yes then how, did the crisis have different impact in the amount of audit fees for 
them. It is obvious that there are major differences between our sample and the ones 
of the existed surveys, not only concerning the regulation but also concerning the size 
of the banks, the macroeconomic environment of each country which by no means is 
the same and of course the level and the nature of the risks that are identified within 
different auditees. We decided to examine PIIGCS’ banks because those were the most 
vulnerable and worst regulated ones. PIIGCS’ banks suffered major liquidity difficulties. 
In those countries there were more financial institutions before crisis comparing to the 
current amount, since those that suffered the greatest issues have been merged or 
acquired by others. This is a reason that makes it interesting both to test those 
countries and also to compare their results prior and after crisis. We did choose audit 
fees as a point of interest since after the crisis people realized the significance of both 
internal and external audit. Have the audit and the related regulations been stricter 
and efficient, crisis might have not been occurred at all or at least have different 
outcome.  Hence, our rationale behind examining those countries was that since they 
were affected differently from crisis they might have different attitude concerning the 
audit fees after crisis as well. 
Other major drivers of audit attention, at least for the U.S public company audit 
engagement, are the size of the firm to be audited along with the complexity (Davis, 
Ricchiute & Trompeter 1993; Fields Fraser & Wilkins 2004; Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & 
Lobo 2010). On the other hand, recent studies reveal that auditors have difficulties in 
understanding the above audit engagement with the macroeconomic changes 
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particularly when it has to do with dynamic ones (Peecher et al. 2007, Brewster 2011). 
However, large-sample research is absent on this topic due to the fact that occasions 
with changes in audit environments and risks are very rare.  
What is more, literature also states that audit fees are highly affected by audit labor 
usage and mix (O’ Keefe et al. 1994; Bell et al., 2008). Another important finding of 
literature is that there is a small yet important fee premium when there is an audit 
engagement under high business risk circumstances meaning a firm with great 
riskiness (Bell et al., 2008). Doogar, Rowe and Sivadasan (2015) built their research on 
the basis that if auditors recognize and respond well in advance the situation during 
crisis, then labor mix and usage along with potential additional fee would be reflected 
in a change of the linkage between bank audit fees and primary measures of banks’ 
risk.  
An additional important aspect that constitutes a field of research is auditor’s 
independence. The latter is significant to exist in order to assure public confidence 
within the market. However, as Fields et al. (2004) observed, there is little research 
concerning the relationship among banks and their external auditors even if the 
significance of the financial institution sector is common knowledge. Generally, 
researchers questioned if auditors’ independence is under threat when they are 
depending in a high extend in terms of financial aspects but one big client. Carcello and 
Neal (2000) state that auditor might depend a lot on a client in case that non-audit 
services’ fees are high.  
In an attempt to deal with this threat that concerns audit independence, the U.S 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2001 set as a basic requirement of all public 
firms to present in their annual financial statements all crucial and critical information 
about audit and non-audit fees. Ethics suggest that an auditor must cancel the 
engagement with big clients especially when a high percentage of the audit firm’s 
annual turnover derives from them. Furthermore, Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 
imposed relevant rules that protect auditors’ independence. Kanagaretnam, Krishnan 
and Lobo (2010), stated that there are major reasons why there is a need to examine 
auditor’s independence within banks. For example, they highlighted that U.S banks are 
[14] 
 
strictly supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal 
Reserve Board as well as other bodies and what is more the aforementioned bodies 
strengthened the regulations for banks during 1991 in a way that there were stricter 
requirements on auditing of banks which have assets more than $500 million. The 
latter circumstance changed to $1 billion on 2005. In the same Act, Section 36 the 
authorities imposed the requirement of external audit over the internal controls of the 
all applicable to this law banks (Murphy 2004). After these regulations, related parties 
started wonder whether auditors’ independence is relatively higher for large financial 
institutions. They implemented a survey on whether banks’ audit fees are related to 
the extent of earnings management through loan loss provisions (LLP). Their findings 
indicate that unexpected audit or non-audit fees are unrelated to any fluctuation of 
LLP as far as large banks are concerned something that leads to the conclusion of no 
actual relation between those fees and earnings management. On the other hand, in 
small banks, they observed a negative relation between the above mentioned 
parameters. The latter result indicates higher earnings management within small 
banks, that are exempt from major regulation as referred above, and which pay more 
fees to their auditors. Summing up, according to their research auditor independence 
is under threat only in the case of small financial institutions and particularly when 
there is high audit fee and audit client positive correlation. Hence, their main 
statement is there are greater chances that small banks will overstate earnings when 
they pay highly their auditors.  
2.1. Development of Auditing 
Auditing procedures are being used for quite a long time, however, not in their current 
form.  The main difference is that so far auditors would emphasize to the past in order 
to recognize and detect material past mistakes. Of course, a great amount of the 
occurred misstatements may never be detected. Nowadays, auditors try to alter that 
historical attitude and adopt a more radical approach.  Particularly they try to 
understand deeply the functions in order to understand well in advance what errors 
might occur in the near future, detect and hence, tackle them. 
Historically, auditing was broadly adopted after the Industrial Revolution that resulted 
in a huge increase in business activities.  It was some specific activities, for instance the 
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railroads that necessitated the establishment of such mechanisms both reliable and 
able to detect fraudulent actions. Furthermore, the fact that year by year more and 
more firms were entering the stock market made it necessary for accounting people to 
find a way to reassure investors that financial statements were not materially 
misstated. Yet, although that the aforementioned events were crucial for the intense 
use of auditing, the Big stock market crash occurred during 1929 was the basic motive 
for auditing to be improved and used broader. What is more, after the crash 
mentioned above, in the United States audit procedures became mandatory. In order 
to deeply establish the implementation of audit procedures Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was set up during 1934. The body was responsible for the 
supervision of publicly traded corporations and for the strict implementation of the 
existed regulation. Moreover, a very important action that SEC took was to force listed 
firms to submit reports more that once every year, so that investors would be timely 
informed about the financial condition of a firm. It is worth to state that SEC was ruling 
in accordance to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which was a 
further reassurance for all related parties. Furthermore, the new standards and rules 
were not solely new mechanisms. Regulators did take into consideration all the existed 
regulations and in some cases, they even mandate various optional by that time audit 
procedures. This resulted mainly due to fraudulent events that happened and 
consequently auditors took measures against potential similar future events. For 
instance, inspections of inventories and receivables and observation became major 
obligatory auditing techniques. It is of great important that even after the explosion of 
automated accounting systems (AAS), the aforementioned practices were 
irreplaceable. This can be justified simply by considering the fact that the first AAS was 
released by UNIVAC in the market already during 1954, but people began using it only 
after 1960. For this, however, important role played the book Electronic Data 
Processing and Auditing by Felix Kaufman in 1961 that helped people and motivated 
them to get used with computers and finally use them. During 1930 International 
Business Machines (IBM) released a new device that further facilitated and enabled 
the use of AAS. So we can assume that these events were the initial ones in order to 
overpass the historic manual accounting processes. However, we must refer to the fact 
that auditors may decided to use the new devices but they could not easily dispatch 
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from the manual input (known as auditing around the computer) and get used to 
completely rely upon the software of the AAS (known as auditing through the 
computer). The evolution of auditing continued one step further after the Equity 
Corporation Scandal during 1973, which is referred in the global history as the unique 
scandal in the electronic data processing scandal. It was the case of fraud related to 
untruthful commission income and wrong insurance policies that took place in the 
firm. When this scandal was revealed, it was about time for auditing through the 
computer to be obligatory. Consequently, the biggest audit firms, known as Big 8 at 
that time, created departments with electronic data processing specialists in order to 
audit the electronic systems. In addition to the above steps, one more was the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act during 1977 that prohibited bribery of non American officials in 
favor of American firms to buy business and also mandate these firms to establish 
relevant procedures with a view to detecting such fraudulent actions. The electronic 
data processing became more popular and familiar to accountants after the event of 
the personal computers (Davis, 1968), which incidentally increased in demand by its 
users by 400% during 1962-1967. After these, it was time for another improvement 
process concerning auditing that was achieved through the introduction of the 
computer assisted audit tools (CAAT), a mechanism that basically was linked with 
quality and speed of audit in cases that there was a huge data amount. Other 
advancement that followed CAAT was that of Audit Command Language and 
Interactive Data Extraction and Analysis.  
A most significant step forward, was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 that made it 
even more clear that advanced audit services was mandatory in all publicly traded 
firms. What is more, SOX put extra emphasis on the need for better quality concerning 
both internal control procedures and financial statements something for what 
management and external auditors were responsible. SOX is also important because it 
emphasizes in the responsibility of audit firms and auditors to create a fraud detection 
strategy every time they were providing audit services to a company. 
Regulators soon after the introduction of the SOX in 2002 realized that there is space 
for improvements concerning the regulatory system and procedures of auditing (Li, 
2009). Basically, they introduced a new section of SOX that was dealing with the audit 
[17] 
 
of internal controls. Hence, in 2004 the Auditing Standard No 2 (AS2) was in fact an 
attempt to better monitoring the internal control system of firms (Krishnan, Krishnan, 
& Song, 2011). Relevant research resulted in evidence that show the impact of the 
above introduction. The results state that AS2 gave auditors an incentive to boost 
audit fees even higher. Consequently, due to accuses for excessive costs, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) released a new Standard, Auditing 
Standard no 5 (AS5) as an attempt to fix the aforementioned issue. PCAOB stated that 
the new Standard not only will fix the problem but it will also result in important cost 
savings within firms. It goes without saying, that the introduction and consequently 
the implementation of the new Standard set an alarm to researcher in order to 
determine the effect of the latter on audit fees. Krishnan, Krishnan and Son (2011), 
attempted to investigate the change concerning audit fees that was due to the shift 
from AS2 to AS5.  They tested a sample of firms each of which used the same auditor 
the last year of AS2 and the first two years of AS5. They found significant evidence that 
ceteris paribus indeed, audit fees were lower during the first two years of the new 
standard. Moreover, they found that audits fees were relatively higher within firms 
with adverse opinion on internal controls. The latter, however, was a fact also under 
AS2. The difference is that the amount was relatively smaller under AS5 something 
that can be explained by the over- conservatism that exists under AS5. Finally, their 
tests resulted in controversial expectations with PCAOB that AS5 will decrease audit 
fees in smaller companies more than the amount in larger.   
However, no matter how much audit procedures and regulations have been improved 
during the last century, there is still space for advances. In particular, there is a need 
for even more advanced and more timely continuous assurance systems, as auditors 
like to name them, in order to be able with the use of them to detect potential 
fraudulent transactions. This is the future audit conditions that auditors and investors 
try to develop and establish. Evidence obtained by the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners state that fraud losses continue to follow an escalating trend as a result of 
the use of traditional auditing procedures.  
To make things more understandable, we should clarify that traditional auditing refers 
to the typical audit procedure that includes a contractual agreement, a risk assessment 
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along with an audit plan and strategy, the collection of information and evidence 
obtained from the management and finally the audit report. In terms of using the 
traditional audit it is clear that it will probably require more time and also it costs more 
until the final conclusion and that are considered to be disadvantages. Nowadays, 
auditors who are in favor of this audit method have managed to overcome the 
aforementioned cons by aggregating the transactions’ inputs so that the feedback will 
not require much time. In future audit, audit procedures will be gradually cut off from 
manual inputs and the use of automated systems, as referred previously, will be 
enhanced. However, even if it might be the case that these systems are more effective 
and efficient they do have various drawbacks. The most significant one is the fact that 
they do not operate continuously, which results in a non-completely verified audit 
environment. All in all, researchers and auditors conclude that there must be further 
research in order to tackle all the disadvantages and manage to reach a complete 
automated audit process which is actually what future audit represents.  
2.2. Risks in the Banking Sector 
So far, we have been discussed about auditing and the determinants of audit fees. 
Now, we will present the most important risks that a bank is likely to face since our 
research is focused on banks and simultaneously will link those risks to audit fees. The 
major risks are considered to be: credit risk, liquidity risk, operating risk, capital risk 
and finally market risk. Below, each and one of the mentioned risks will be explained 
as it is very important to understand the nature of the functioning of a bank.  
2.2.1. Credit risk 
Credit risk refers to the fact that a lender will not get back the money that lent. In 
other words, it has to do with the inability of the borrower to return the loan that a 
bank provided them. Credit risk is thought to be the most important risk for banks, 
especially for commercial banks. It is known, that commercial banks make profit by the 
interest they gain from loans. Thus, the risk that the bank will not get back even the 
principal loan’s amount is an extremely risky scenario for its function continuance. 
During the crisis that we are examining, the levels of credit risk were very high since 
the crisis soon became a mortgage housing one. However, credit risk is likely to occur 
in securities portfolio apart from the loan one. Banks in order to measure the levels of 
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the credit risk within their loans often require collaterals in order to use their value in 
case of loans that are not being paid back. The relationship that stands between audit 
fees and commercial loans is positive, since the latter is a risk determinant.  
2.2.2. Liquidity risk 
Charles Goodhart has noted that, “Liquidity and solvency are the heavenly twins of 
banking, frequently indistinguishable. An illiquid bank can rapidly become insolvent, 
and an insolvent bank illiquid” (Goodhart, 2008). Liquidity risk refers to the case that a 
bank will not have the appropriate amount of cash to carry out its day to day 
operations, meaning meet its obligations and also be able to provide loans. What is 
very important for a bank is to report provisions for sufficient liquidity. We are familiar 
with the bad case scenario of not reporting correctly the above element, since the last 
financial crisis was also a result of such an attitude. A liquidity shortfall apart from 
tarnishing a bank’s reputation, can also lead to distress, when a bank is not able to pay 
its loans to other financial institutions (Armstrong & Caldwell, 2008). This might lead to 
a domino of banks’ bankruptcies.  Hence, a major difference between liquidity risk and 
the rest risks is that it be occurred in both asset side and liability side if a bank.  
Another related hazard, is that of a bank run. When people realize that there might be 
a liquidity issue, they urge to withdraw huge cash amounts resulting in even more 
liquidity problems. Banks with larger amounts of accounts transactions bear greater 
liquidity risk and as a consequence they need to pay more audit fees. To avoid at least 
one side of liquidity risk, commercial banks avoid long term securities, and instead 
they prefer to own portfolios with short term, liquid instruments. Liquidity risk has 
been described as a “consequential risk”, meaning that it never arises on its own but it 
is rather accompanied by a rise in one of the other financial risks (Matz & Neu, 2007). 
What is more, there is evidence that liquidity risk is highly likely to interact with either 
market risk or credit risk. Nowadays, and basically due to the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008, regulators have increased a lot the liquidity levels that a bank must have per 
year. In EU, the percentage is increasing every year, while during 2017 was 80% 
something that really strengthens the terms for when a bank can give a loan.  
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2.2.3. Operating risk 
Operating risk refers to the probability that the high amount of operating costs will 
eventually have a negative effect to the capital account of the financial institution. 
Banks use the efficiency ratio in order to measure the operating risk. This ratio has 
negative correlation with the capability of a bank to make profit. High efficiency ratios 
indicate high amounts of transactions accounts. There is evidence that the higher the 
efficiency ratios the lower the audit fees to be paid, something that stems from the 
transaction amounts level that is positively related to the bank’s complexity.  
2.2.4. Capital risk  
Capital risk is the risk is the probability that an investor will lose the initial capital 
amount of his/her investments. In banks, there are two counterparts. One is that of 
the shareholders that have an interest on the returns of the capital they had invested 
in the bank and thus they do not want equity to be very high. On the other side, 
creditors of the bank along with depositors, have a great need equity to be at least 
sufficient so they can assure their money are safe. This is the reason that banks and 
basically regulation, uses measures such as the capital adequacy ratio so as to keep a 
balance between these two parts. Another measure used to count the level of capital 
risk, are the intangible assets. Banks with more intangible assets are considered as 
more complex and thus it is expected that they spend more in audit fees.  
2.2.5. Market risk  
Market risk is the also known as systematic risk since it cannot be avoided by 
diversification measures. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision considers 
market risk as the risk that stems from movements in market prices resulting in losses. 
Hence, market risk is affected by any change in capital markets and interest rates. 
Some decades ago, risk management was not meant to be used as a measure of 
market risk (Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, 1996). The fact that banks realized that 
market risk is composed by other significant inferior risks, was the beginning for a 
wider approach on risk measurements. 
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2.3. Banks and crisis 
One of the most interesting characteristics of the current global financial crisis is the 
fact that it has its origins in the financial center that is the United States mortgage 
sector and it continued with a domino effect to the rest significant ones such as Europe 
and Asia (Talani 2011; Stiglitz 2010). It is true that the recent crisis resulted in the 
failure or bankruptcy of many eminent financial institutions (i.e. Lehman Brothers) 
something that made people wonder what the main reasons for this market disorder 
were. The fact that financial institutions were able to create money so easy and fast 
with a view to using it for real estate activities and further for speculation is said to be 
the major driver for the above mentioned market condition. This new amount of 
money was introduced in the shape of loans and particularly, relevant evidence reveals 
that only during 2000- 2007, the total debt and money amount was twice the size it 
was before. The worst part of it is that only 8% of the aforementioned new money was 
channeled in business other than banks.  It is worth stating that the high mortgage rate 
was the basic drawback to characterize the loans given to people. 
However, providing the property market with extra amounts of money results to the 
problem that people will eventually be unable to pay back their lenders, something 
that unfortunately did happen. The uncontrolled power that financial institutions had 
to provide loans even to clients with the least credibility created fertile ground for the 
bubble to explode (Talani, 2011). To be more specific, loan lenders were making profit 
based on the amount of loans they would sell. Hence, it does make sense why they did 
not care intensively for the client’s credibility (Gamble, 2009). Consequently, total debt 
amount was significantly greater than the income and thus, many banks were in 
danger of collapsing. Lord (Adair) Turner, being the chairman of UK’s Financial Services 
Authority, confirmed by his statement that their failure to control banks from creating 
money was the root of the crisis. Eventually, a dramatically high level in interest rates 
was the first step when the housing sector collapse and then it snowballed to the 
financial sector (Gamble, 2009:22).  
When the crisis was in its beginning banks decreased the loan number, something that 
resulted in the decrease of the house prices. Consequently, speculators had to sell 
their assets and finally the bubble burst. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers bank 
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during 2008 signaled the beginning of the biggest global financial crisis, as many 
economists support, which has been occurred after the recession of 1929. Afterwards, 
failures of important American and European banks followed. The American financial 
crisis has undoubtedly triggered the European crisis since the majority of events were 
common troublemakers for both continents.  It goes without saying that the housing 
sector issue also expanded to Europe making the economic downturn unavoidable. 
Countries that affected highly throughout Europe were Spain, Ireland, and Italy 
basically due to the fact the within these economies real estate bubbles that were 
created by fake plus extremely low interest rates were about to explode. When the 
American financial difficulties have eventually “arrived” in Europe, the aforementioned 
countries got immediately into trouble since demand for properties had been lowered 
dramatically resulting in bank bankruptcies. In the aftermath of this turmoil, economic 
crisis was already reality for Eurozone and the first events took place in the form of 
significant downward trend in the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of all EU member 
states. Cyprus and Greece affected heavily by that effect and their nightmare began 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013). Simultaneously, unemployment rates followed an upward 
trend, tax revenues decreased dramatically while expenditure increased resulting in 
great difficulties within each nation.  
In order to communicate the skepticism based on which we decided to focus on 
PIIGCS’ banks, we will briefly present crucial key points within the financial crisis’ years 
that took place in those countries. We are all familiar with the introduction date of 
Euro that was on 1999, when eleven countries only were considered able, in terms of 
requirements, to adopt the new currency. It is worth mentioning that Ireland, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal were included in the eleven countries. Greece entered the Eurozone 
few years later, basically on 2001 and Cyprus in 2008. When the crisis spread in Greece 
people speculated that the country has never met the requirements to enter the 
Eurozone and that the crisis in Greece was an obvious and reasonable result.  
At this point let’s put facts in an appropriate time order. On Friday Sept. 15, 2008 
Lehman Brothers bankrupt and within few days the crisis has already been spread to 
Europe. Soon Iceland went bankrupt and that was the time that bells started ringing 
for Europe. Regulators, rating agencies and billion homeowners were taken aback in 
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the name of the housing bubble. In Europe, Germany and England tried to stand by 
Europe to bail out banks.  In 2009 Greece’s budget deficit reached the level of 13.6% 
(according to Eurostat) of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) a figure that is four times 
the appropriate level according to Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria for 
Eurozone member states. One year later, in 2010 Spain and Portugal introduced 
austerity measures in their countries while at the same time Spain’s budget deficit 
reached 11.2 % of its GDP. Soon after those public expenses reductions were 
announced in both countries. The same year Greece asks for help, meaning loan 
amounting 45 billion euro from the International Monetary Fund along with Eurozone 
states in order to not go bankrupt. Consequently, further austerity measures took 
place, a significant increase of taxes and decrease in spending were voted. So far, the 
crucial disorders within Europe were first the sovereign debt and second the 
difficulties that bank countries within euro i.e. PIIGCS had to deal with. The general 
disorder of the banking sector was more than obvious at that time and became even 
more alarming when the European Central Bank introduced the Securities Markets 
Program under which it could be able to buy all government bonds that were not 
interesting for any investor. It goes without saying that the financial sector was 
officially under threat and banks were facing a very difficult period for which there was 
no experience. Another measure taken to protect EU countries from a domino failure 
trend, was the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility, which would 
provide loans to those European countries that were struggling against huge liquidity 
difficulties. Even though that the best would have been measures to have occurred 
prior the crisis, all the above were crucial factors that helped avoid the ultimate failure 
either of nations or of Europe in total as many speculators fear that time. We are 
familiar with the fact that the majority of European banks couldn’t were failing in the 
stress tests. The situation became worst when Ireland asked for a bailout of 85 billion 
euros. Few months later, in the rise of the 2nd quarter of 2011 Portugal receives a 78 
billion euros bailout something that led the ECB to a 50 basis points increase of its 
interest rates in an attempt to deal with inflation which at that time was 2.6%. Soon 
and during the same year, EFSF was replaced by the European Stability Mechanism 
that was a permanent bailout fund and began its operation by the end of 2012. Greece 
was still in significantly alarming danger and thus, a reduction of its debt by 50% was 
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announced and the rating agency S&P classified as default the Greek credit rating.  
Moving forward, Hungary a noneuro- area member applied for a bailout something 
that was neglected by the European authorities and the International Monetary Fund 
for various reasons. Months later both Spain and Cyprus requested a bailout with the 
former clarified that there was a need only for the Spanish banks. From the above facts 
it is clear that eurozone was in deep recession mood with various upcoming ups and 
downs in its interest rates and member states’ ratings, a problem that undoubtedly 
affected even eminent countries after some point, such was France that faced a 
downgrade of one notch by Moody’s. It goes without saying that the financial sector 
crisis has been intensively researched during the past years and some results that deal 
with the relation between crisis and different bank characteristics are of great interest. 
A recent study of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) provides evidence that banks which 
performed better during the last year before crisis that is 2006, performed worst 
during the first two years of the crisis. This can be better understood as a result of the 
Tsunami effect that states the various attributes that were more precious for the 
market on 2006 created various risks to banks and as a result they performed poorly 
after 2006. However, this reaction was not meant to be since the market did not value 
these attributes as weaknesses. In the same paper, the researchers found that banks 
with shareholder-friendly boards performed worst during crisis something that is 
linked with the fact that by trying to create more wealth for shareholders 
simultaneously leads to an increase of both costs and risks associated. Governance 
may not be a strong determinant of bank performance but on the other side, they 
concluded that bank balance sheet and profitability rates are. Basically, as it can easily 
be expected, banks with bigger asset amounts and higher Tier 1 managed to perform 
better during the global distress due to liquidity issues. All these were reasons to 
answer why some banks managed to perform better than other during the last 
depression period. 
2.4. Determinants of Audit Fees 
Before presenting our research implementation we should determine what are the 
main factors that determine the amount of audit fees to be paid. As in every 
transaction, the client and the provider of the service are the sources of those factors. 
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Below, main characteristics of an auditor along with the equivalent of an auditee are 
being presented.  
Major characteristic of an auditor is its size (Causholli, Martinis, Hay & Knechel, 2010). 
The amount of fees that an audit firm will charge its clients is highly depended on the 
size of the former and consequently its reputation (Gregory & Collier, 1996). This is 
obvious simply by considering the existence of Big 4 firms. The reputation is the most 
important asset that those firms have. Deloitte’s main driver policy is the safety of its 
reputation and this value is always one of the first issues partners, managers and 
everyone that works for Deloitte, hear or talk about. This attitude on its own is 
efficient to help understand how valuable is to remain one of the Big 4. The 
importance of reputation can be easily understood by considering the case of Arthur 
Andersen that after its contribution to Enron’s fraud case; it disappeared completely 
from the audit sector. It is worth mentioning, that both firms used to be leaders in 
their industries. Previous research has shown that indeed, fees being charged by a Big 
4 firm are higher than those by non-Big4. Furthermore, Big 4 companies are found to 
charge premium fees something that is not the case for audit firms other than the Big 
4 ones (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, & Raghnandan, 
2003; Andre, Broye, Pong & Schatt, 2011; Kwon et al., 2014). 
 Apart from the reputation, another major pillar for auditors is the quality. Quality and 
size are considered to be positively related. The bigger a firm is the more money it has 
to invest in improvements of its services, and thus its quality. However, there are 
studies that provide with evidence that quality and BigN are not always related. 
Lawrence, Meza and Zhang (2011) in their current study found that there is no 
significant difference between the audit quality provided to firms by a Big N and by a 
non-Big N.  
Summing up, although that the majority of prior related research found a positive 
relationship between size and audit fees, there are few studies that state no such 
relationship exists (Meshari, 2008). Our study concludes as well to a positive 
relationship between size and fees.  
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Moreover, it is interesting to mention that in cases where there is a need for initial 
costs it is preferred by auditees’ to keep the existed auditor (DeAngelo, 1981). 
On the other side, various characteristics of the auditee contribute as well on the 
determination of the audit fees. Previous studies found that the quality of the internal 
controls of the auditee has negative correlation with the fees, in particular, Hogan and 
Wilkins (2008) concluded that the more ineffective the internal controls of a firm are 
the more audit fees it has to pay. Indeed, audit firms charge more according to how 
risky a firm is considered to be. This stems from the fact that the audit procedures are 
dramatically increased when there are indications for ineffective internal controls 
something that could easier result in fraudulent behavior within the company. More 
audit procedures mean more audit hours and more auditors to implement the testing. 
Consequently, the price for it is higher. Castro, Peleias & Silva (2015) in their current 
study measured risk in terms of liquidity and leverage and found that firms with higher 
levels of the previous mentioned elements are to spend more for audit. All relevant 
studies had the same conclusion, which mentioned above. Felix, Gramling and Maletta 
(2005), state that the better the internal audit quality the lower the external audit 
fees. Along with the aforementioned, the complexity of the auditee determines also 
the fees (Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006). A firm with many transactions is more difficult 
to be audited, and thus the auditors charge higher. For example, commercial firms 
with inventories and various invoice transactions are considered as more demanding 
audit cases and they require more time until the audit is completed. On the other side, 
simple real estate funds with back to back loans transactions require less testing 
procedures and thus fewer audit hours. Hence, there is an obvious positive relation 
between complexity and fees. It could thus also be thought as an industry related 
matter. Furthermore, according with Ettredge, Xu, and Han (2014) there is a positive 
relationship between audit fees and the proportion of fair value assets held by 
financial institutions.  
Another important characteristic of an auditee is its profitability. Indeed, it has been 
proved that firms with higher profit or loss amounts require more audit hours and as a 
result they are required to pay higher fees. However, not many studies to have used 
profitability as a model’s control exist.  
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Last but not least, many studies especially during the last decade have focused on the 
relationship between corporate governance and audit fees. Here, the results are 
controversial. Bedard & Johnstone (2004) concluded that there is a positive one, and 
thus the better the corporate governance the lower the fees to be charged to them. 
Griffin, Lont and Sun (2008) found similar results, and they further stated that after 
SOX the fees reduced even more. On the other side, there are studies that found that 
firms with high corporate governance levels pay higher audit charges (Hallak & Silva, 
2012). 
3. Research methodology  
 
In this section, are being presented the plan and the actions that need to be taken in 
order to investigate our research question. Furthermore, there is a description of the 
rational of choosing the included variables, the application of the econometric model, 
the techniques and concrete procedures used and finally, the robustness test that has 
been implemented. What is more, the collection, the generation and the analysis of 
the data that have been used are also presented.  
A series of steps were followed for the applied research methodology. Firstly, through 
the basic previous studies and research (literature), which are presented in Table 2, 
there has been examination of the most important confluences regarding the research 
subject of this paper. Consequently, has been formed the both hypothesis and the 
research questions. Secondly, it was decided the structure of the three models and 
controls that will be utilized in each model. In a third level, the correlations and co- 
variations of the parameters, using an appropriate statistical program have been 
checked. In the fourth step, a mathematical regression was formed so as to investigate 
the influence of several controls to the amount of auditor’s fees and thus conclude to 
an interpretation.  
This study is considered as a quantitative research study. It is conducted at the level of 
European Union banking institutions. The main purpose is to interpret the factors 
affecting the amount of audit fees and examine if there is a different pattern regarding 
PIIGCS economies banks against the rest, based upon the final findings.  
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3.1. Dataset  
Firstly, our population is the banks from all over the world. We select our initial sample 
from EU banking institutions listed in Thomson one database and audit fees for the 
years 2004-2016. Then, we select the data regarding our controls. Our search results in 
an initial sample of 157 banks observations. Due to the fact that there were no data for 
the period 2004-2007 we decide to work with after-crisis period data. Furthermore, 
because of the huge number of missing values in many of our controls we decreased 
the examined number of banking institutions. Eventually, the final sample to be used is 
comprised of 91 European banking organizations, 31 of which are banks from PIIGCS 
economies (Table 1). The rest 60 banking institutions are located in European 
countries, which specifically are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Finland, 
Great Britain, Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. The examined audit fees are reported 
in 2008-2016 fiscal years financial statements. The data of the sample are considered 
to be Panel or Longitudinal Data as the unit and time of observations varies, we 
measure the same collection of banks over a period of time. Thus, the sample has both 
time series and cross-sectional dimensions and helps us to address a broader range of 
issues with dynamically changing relationships among them. From now on, due to the 
resemblance among these organizations, we will refer to the sample institutions as 
“banks” or “PIIGCS banks” when referring to banks stated to an economy among 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and Spain. All the organizations contained in 
our sample, which deputize the banking subset of a hand collected database, are 
active listed banks with an unqualified auditor’s opinion in their financial statements 
regarding 2008-2016 fiscal year. 
Table 1- Sample selection 
Selection of the sample 
Initial sample 157  
Final sample   91 
PIIGCS banks Rest EU banks 
31 60 
 
[29] 
 
3.2. Model specification  
In the formulation of an econometric model specific steps have been followed. Based 
on previous economic or financial studies (Table 2), it is formulated an estimable 
theoretical model. The collection of data and model estimation is followed. The next 
level is to check whether the model is statistically adequate. If it is proved as adequate, 
then the interpretation of the model could follow so as to use it for analysis. In every 
model there is an explained variable, which is assumed to be random or stochastic, 
and one (or more) explanatory variable(s) which are considered to be non-stochastic. 
For the purposes of this research paper, three models are used in order to analyze and 
compare the results with the results of the existed audit fee literature. All the models 
have the same explained variable. The first model is based on audit fees literature 
(Table 2) and includes all the 91 European banks for which relevant, adequate and 
current data has been able to gather. In the second model we try to investigate if there 
is a different pattern in PIIGCS’ banks, so we use an extra dummy variable that is for all 
PIIGCS’ banks. Concerning the third model we use the second model including five 
extra explanatory variables and thus we are able to examine deeper not only specific 
issues concerning the profitability of banks along with the provisions for loan losses, 
but also the influence of major macroeconomic factors on audit fees.       
Below, is presented the Table 2 which summarizes major prior studies upon banks 
audit expenditures which were used so as to decide the controls regarding our models. 
The common for all studies is that they use as the dependent variable (y) the audit fee. 
In number 1 it is depicted the title of the study, in number 2 are presenting the authors 
of each paper, 3 is for the year of papers publication, in number 4 is reported the 
specific period tested, 5 is for the country, in 6 we have the number of observations, 7 
the independent variables (x) used, 8 the conclusions of the paper and finally 9 for the 
used database so as to retrieve the study’s final sample.  
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Table 2- Summarized Audit Fee Literature 
Summarized audit fee literature 
1. An investigation of the pricing of audit services for financial institutions 
2. L. Paige Fields, Donald R. Fraser and Michael S. Wilkins 
3. Published in 2004 
4. 2000 
5. United states 
6. 277 
7. Assets, Big4, loss, standard deviation of daily returns, transaction accounts/ 
deposits, securities, efficiency ratio, commercial loans/ gross loans, non-
performing loans/ gross loans, net charge-offs/ loan loss reserve, domestic 
real estate loans/ gross loans, risk adjusted capital ratio, intangible assets/ 
total assets, sensitive ratio and savings.  
8. Higher audit fees for banks with more transaction accounts, greater 
acquisition activity, higher risk adjusted capital required by regulatory 
agencies, fewer securities, lower levels of efficiency and higher credit risk. 
Audit firm’s prices are depending on complexities and risks.  
9. Sheshunoff information services Bank source database 
1. An Empirical Analysis of Auditor Independence in the Banking Industry 
2. Kiridaran kanagaretnam, Gopal V. Krishnan and Gerald J. Lobo 
3. Published in 2010 
4. 2000- 2006 
5. United states  
6. 1740 
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7. Assets, Big5, securities, loss, non-performing loans/ total loans, intangibles/ 
total assets, efficiency, net charge-offs/ loan loss reserve, commercial loans/ 
total loans, consumer loans/ total loans, real estate loans/ total loans, risk 
adjusted capital ratio, exempt (indicator, if a bank has less than $500 million 
in total assets). 
8. Unexpected auditor fees are unrelated to earnings management for large 
banks. Also, for small banks was found higher earnings management via 
under- provisioning of loan losses provisions by banks that pay higher 
unexpected total and non-audit fees to the auditor.  
9. Audit analytics  
1. Asleep at the Wheel (Again)? Bank Audits During the Lead-Up to the Financial 
Crisis 
2. Rajib Doogar, Stephen P. Rowe and Padmakumar Sivadasan. 
3. Published in 2015 
4. 2005-2007 and 2008-2009 
5. United states 
6. 283 
7. Assets, Efficiency, sensitive, savings, net charge-offs/ loan loss reserve, 
intangibles/ total assets, Tier 1 risk based capital ratio, Big4, standard 
deviation of stock returns, mortgage securitization/ total assets, other assets 
held by banks, impairment of goodwill, accelerated filer, delay and initial 
audit engagement or not. 
8. Auditors were able to identify and respond to the macroeconomic shocks to 
banks’ business environment because the risk-based audit approaches in use 
during the period leading up to and including the financial crisis appear to 
have facilitated auditor ability to recognize and respond to audit risks 
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emanating from changes in the auditee’s business environment.  
9. Audit analytics, the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly 
data set, the Wharton Research Data Services bank regulatory filing (FR Y-9C) 
data set and Compustat. 
1. Audit Fees after Remediation of Internal Control Weaknesses 
2. Vishal Munsif, K. Raghunandan, Dasaratha V. Rama and Meghna Singhvi 
3. Published in 2011 
4. First four years of internal control reporting, begin with November 2004.  
5. United states  
6. 1610  
7. Assets, foreign operations or not, proportion of total assets in accounts 
receivable and inventory, square root of the number of segments, probability 
of bankruptcy, Big4, audit opinion, extraordinary items or discontinued 
operations, initial year of audit or not and material weakness in internal 
control.  
8. Remediating firms have lower audit fees when compared to firms that 
continue to report material weaknesses in internal control. audit fees are 
"sticky" for firms that have material weaknesses in internal controls over 
financial reporting. 
9. Audit analytics and Compustat  
 
3.3. Summary analysis   
Thomson one database was used in order to collect data for the sample of 91 banks for 
9 continuously years. In all three models, logarithmic transformations are being used 
for audit fees and total assets. In Table 3 are being presented the definitions of the one 
untransformed dependent and more untransformed independent variables, which are 
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used in the three models. This table specifies the meaning and the way of calculation 
concerning the variables. 
Table 3- Definitions of variables 
Variables definitions 
Audit fees: Represent the amount paid by the bank annually for the 
professional examination and verification of the financial 
statements for the purpose of rendering an opinion as to their 
consistency, fairness and conformation to accepted accounting 
principles. Also, includes audit fee for consultancy.  
Total assets: Represent the sum of cash & due from banks, total investments, 
net loans, customer liability on acceptances, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, real estate assets, net property, 
plant and equipment and other assets. Includes trust business 
assets. Adjusted to exclude treasury stock. Adjusted to exclude 
investment in own bonds.  
BIG4 auditors: The four largest audit firms in the world are known as BIG4 and 
they offer audit, assurance, taxation, consulting and other 
services. They handle audits both for private and public 
companies. For the years 2008-2016, relating our research, the 
professional services network called BIG4 are Deloitte and 
Touche, Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC), Ernst & Young (EY) and 
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). All the other audit 
companies are known as non Big4.  
Car ratio: Capital Adequacy ratio represents a bank’s capital measure. It is 
the amount resulting from the division of total capital (Tier 1 & 
Tier 2) to risk weighted assets. The higher the Car ratio the more 
protected the depositors are. Basel has set a threshold for Car 
ratio so as to increase the stability and efficiency of financial 
institutions.  
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Intangible Assets/ 
Total Assets: 
Intangibles represent other assets not having a physical existence. 
The value of these assets lies in their expected future return. It 
includes: Goodwill/Cost in excess of net assets 
purchased, Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, Formulae, Franchises of no specific 
duration, Capitalized software development costs/Computer 
programs, Organizational costs, Customer lists, Licenses of no 
specific duration, Capitalized advertising cost, Mastheads 
(newspapers), Capitalized servicing rights, Purchased servicing 
right. 
Non-performing 
loans/ Total loans: 
Non-Performing Loans / Loans-Total * 100. Non-performing Loans 
represent the amount of loans that the bank foresees difficulty in 
collecting. It includes: Non-accrual loans, Reduced rate 
loans, Renegotiated loans, Loans past due 90 days or more. It 
excludes: Assets acquired in foreclosures, Repossessed personal 
property. 
Efficiency ratio: The efficiency ratio is calculated by dividing the operating 
expenses to total revenue. Is the proxy for banks operating risk 
and it demonstrates who many cents of every euro of revenue 
will pay operating expenses. For a banking institution the 
efficiency ratio helps to estimate the capacity to turn assets into 
revenue. This allows analysts to evaluate the performance of a 
bank. 
PIIGCS countries: This acronym refers to the economies of Southern European 
countries of Portugal, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Ireland. It is 
used in economics and finance sectors and is related with the 
effects of economic vulnerability and growing debt of these 
European countries.  
ROA: Return on Assets represents the level of profitability of a 
company relative to its total assets. It is an indicator of the 
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efficiency and capability of the management to generate revenue 
utilizing its assets.  
Total Liabilities/ 
Total Assets: 
Total Liabilities represent all short and long-term obligations 
expected to be satisfied by the company. More specifically, it 
includes: Current Liabilities, Long Term Debt, Provision for Risk 
and Charges, Deferred taxes, Deferred income, Other 
liabilities, Deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves, Unrealized 
gain/loss on marketable securities (insurance 
companies), Pension/Post retirement benefits, Securities 
purchased under resale agreements (banks). It excludes: Minority 
Interest, Preferred stock equity, Common stock equity, Non-
Equity reserves. 
Growth of GDP: Gross Domestic Product is driven by personal consumption, 
business investment, government spending and net trade 
(exports – imports). Growth GDP rate compares the country’s 
gross domestic product to the previous one. In fact, it is the most 
important indicator of economic health because it measures how 
fast the economy is growing. GDP growth rate is positive when an 
economy is expanding and negative when an economy suffers a 
recession.  
Inflation rate: Represents the rate at which the general level of prices for goods 
and services is rising and so the purchasing power of currency is 
falling.  
Provisions for loan 
losses/ Total 
loans: 
Provision for Loan Losses / (Loans-Total - Interbank Loans) * 100. 
Losses that the bank expects to take as a result of uncollectible or 
troubled loans. 
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In Table 4 are being presented the selected summary data for the whole sample. In the 
first column it is described the summary measure and in the second column we have 
the name, when it exists, of the associated regression variable.  
Table 4- Financial Information for 91 banking institutions reporting audit fees for 
2008-2016 
Summary data for 91 banking institutions 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Median Min Max 
Audit fee (€ mil) LOGFEE 8,47 1,52 0,02 118,2 
Total assets (€ mil) LOGASS 233009,25 33649,12 74,48 2476671,67 
Total deposits (€ mil) - 90434,42 13617,36 0,79 1208885,95 
Net income (€ mil) - 100,02 3,65 -99,84 21706,02 
Equity (€ mil) - 20,49 5,59 -98,41 10618,15 
 
Table 4 shows that there is a fair amount of deviation in audit fees that banks pay. 
Getin Noble Bank SA, located in Poland, paid € 0, 02 million for the years 2009 and 
2010, which is the minimum amount of audit fees in our sample. On the contrary, 
Banco Santander SA, located in Spain, paid € 118, 2 million for the year 2015. The 
median audit fee for the sample banking institutions is € 1, 52 million. The biggest 
client is Royal Bank of Scotland with € 2476671, 67 million total assets, reported in 
2008 and the smallest, regarding size, is Getin Noble Bank SA. The median value of 
total assets is approximately € 33649, 12 million. Total deposits have a median value of 
€ 13617, 36 million, while HSBC Holdings Plc has the largest amount of deposits. 
Concerning the net income, there is a wide distribution across banking institutions. The 
German bank Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft had reported a € 99, 84 million losses 
in 2008. Contrariwise, the higher profit of € 21706, 02 million was reported by the 
Polish Bank Millennium SA. 
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In the table 5 below are presenting some extra information about the controls of the 
three models. The controls are categorized according to the, related to the banking 
industry, risk they represent. Some of them are used by bank regulatory agencies. In 
the first column is described the risk measure and in the second column we have the 
name of the associated regression variable.  
Table 5- Controls information categorized by risk measures 
Liquidity risk measures 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min Max 
Total 
liabilities/ 
total assets 
LIABASSETS 0,93 0,26 0,92 0,34 3,78 
Provision for 
loan losses/ 
total loans 
PROVLLOSSES 1,1 1,29 0,71 -1,32 12,29 
Operating risk measure 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min Max 
Efficiency 
ratio 
EFFICIENCY 1338,38 8098,18 0,9 -0,54 90986,25 
Credit risk measure 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min Max 
Non-
performing 
loans/ total 
NONPERFLOANS 6,37 8,9 3,7 0 64,07 
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loans (%) 
Capital risk measures 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min Max 
Risk- adjusted 
capital ratio 
(%) 
CARRATIO 15,22 6,22 14,4 -6,1 67,17 
Intangible 
assets/ total 
assets 
INTANG 0,61 4,67 0,003 -0,003 64,4 
Macroeconomic factors 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min Max 
Growth of 
GDP 
GROWTHGDP 0,53 3,12 0,9 -9,1 26,3 
Inflation rate INFL 0,009 0,06 0,001 -0,92 0,047 
Profitability measure 
Variable Regression 
variable 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median Min Max 
Return on 
assets 
ROA 0,14 2,28 0,41 -29,83 8,64 
 
The financial crisis has affected the liquidity of the banks and this is confirmed from 
the table above. The debt to assets ratio median is 92%, declaring a huge liquidity 
problem. Caisse Regionale banks ratio is 3, 78, which mean that has 3,78 times more 
liabilities than assets. The ratio provision for loan losses to total loans could be either a 
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credit risk measure. The median 71% demonstrates the possibility of not repaying a 
loan. Bankia SAU, a Spanish bank (PIIGCS bank), has the higher ratio regarding 
provision for loan losses.  
The efficiency ratio gauges a banking’s institution overhead as a percentage of its 
revenue. An interesting point can arise from the fact that the operating risk measure 
has a huge standard deviation. This is also evident from the large dimension between 
the minimum and the maximum value. The median value is approximately 90%, which 
means that 90 cents of every euro of revenues is used to cover operating expenses. It 
is generally considered that a 50% ratio is the maximum topnotch efficiency ratio. The 
higher the efficiency ratio the higher the operating expenses a bank have, or the lower 
its revenues.  
We have one representative measure for credit risk, but we can also involve the 
provision for loan losses to total loans ratio which is presenting in table. During the 
economic crisis, there was an increase in non-performing loans especially in PIIGCS 
countries which suffer more. It is known that Greece and Cyprus banks faced a 40% or 
more non-performing loans/ total loans ratio in 2015, due to the implementation of 
capital control and the big recession. The median value is 3, 7 %. A Greek bank, Bank of 
Piraeus S.A., had the maximum ratio (64, 07 %), regarding non-performing loans, in 
2013. The allocation of non-performing exposures, which is depicted in the loan 
portfolio composition, is highly abnormal because of the different degree of influence 
from the crisis between PIIGCS countries and the other European countries.  
The median for risk- adjusted capital ratio is 15, 22 %. The Polish Getin Noble Bank S.A. 
had the highest capital adequacy ratio (67, 17 %) in 2008. National Bank of Greece had 
the lowest rate (-6, 1 %) in 2012, through the sovereign crisis. For our 91 banks, the 
ratio concerning intangibles has a median value of 0,003 and a 61 % mean revealing 
the enhancing activity of banks.  
The macroeconomic measures indicate the economic condition of a country and not so 
much of the bank. Every bank is adversely affected by the situation of the country in 
which it is located. As regard the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Ireland had 
the higher growth of GDP (26,3 %) in 2015. Greece had a downsizing  
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9,1 % of GDP for 2011, an extremely difficult year for the country. The big difference 
between the two PIIGCS countries growth of GDP is due to the complex factors that 
lead each country to be involved to the crisis and to the different timing. Ireland had to 
face a massive property bubble, but Greece had to face the doubling commitments (in 
real terms over 10 years). The inflation rate hadn’t significant fluctuations. This is why 
the European Central Bank has as main objective to maintain price stability. Especially 
price inflation in Euro zone is measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP), which was adopted in 1998 by the ECB’s Governing Council, and defines the 
rate close to 2% over the medium term. The median value is 0,001 and the extreme 
values are -0, 92 for Greece in 2013 and 4,71 % for Greece in 2010.  
The median of the profitability measure, Roa is 0, 41. Investeringsselskabet Luxor AS, 
located in Denmark, had the lowest return on assets -29, 83, the negative value 
indicates that the bank does not use properly its capital and creates suspicions for 
inefficient management. Arbuthnot Banking Group PLC, located in Great Britain, had 
succeeded the highest return on assets from our sample (8, 64).  
Furthermore, in Table 6 we made a comparison, concerning all the variables, of means 
and medians between PIIGCS banks and non PIIGCS banks.  
Table 6- Test of differences for the variables between PIIGCS and non PIIGCS banks 
Test of differences for the variables between PIIGCS and non PIIGCS banks 
 PIIGCS Banks Non PIIGCS Banks 
Variables  Mean Median Mean Median 
Audit fee 8,37 1,5 8,48 1,52 
Total assets 234486,50 30026,63 233009,25 33649,12 
Roa 0,11 0,37 0,14 0,41 
Carratio 15,25 14,30 15,23 14,40 
Intang 0,6716 0,0034 0,6187 0,0033 
Liabassets 0,93 0,93 0,9 0,91 
Provllosses 1,15 0,75 1,10 0,72 
Nonperformloans 6,78 4,01 6,43 3,74 
GrowthGDP 0,48 0,90 0,54 0,90 
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Inflation  0,0094 0,013 0,0098 0,012 
Efficiency  1354,33 0,9126 1338,38 0,911 
 
Observing the Table 6, it is very interesting that the mean and the median concerning 
the variables of PIIGCS banks and non PIIGCS banks are close enough. The 
interpretation is that there isn’t a different pattern, regarding our controls, in PIIGCS 
banks during crisis. Contrary to our prior expectations, we are expecting to find no 
significance to PIIGCS variable. It seems that all the banks are affected in the same way 
to the middle of the crisis. It would be very stimulating if we could compare the same 
measures before and after crisis.  
Table 7- Auditor's Information 
Audit firm  Audits % of Audits Median client 
assets (€ mil) 
Deloitte and Touche  25 27,47 % 239612,9 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 24 26,37 % 134879,2 
KPMG 18 19,78 % 170156,6 
Ernst & Young 16 17,58 % 324276,9 
Other (Mazars,  
Crowe Horwath International and 
other firms) 
8 8,79 % 456403,2 
Sum  91 100 % - 
 
Chosen data items by audit firm are analyzed in table 7. Based on the table above, we 
conclude that for the sample of 91 banks Deloitte & Touche has the highest audit 
market share with a 27,47 % of total audits. Market share is determined in terms of 
the number of banks audited. PriceWaterhouseCoopers follows with a small difference 
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(26,37 % of total audits). Although Deloitte & Touche has carried out audits in more 
European banks, which makes it the leading audit firm, Ernst & Young with 17,58 % 
and other auditors with 8,79 % market share had audited banking institutions with 
greater average total assets (€ 324276,9 and € 456403,2 respectively). A remarkable 
point can arise from the fact that non Big4 audit firms (other) have conducted only the 
8,79 % of total audits but they had the biggest clients, based on the median client 
assets (€ 456403,2), which is an indicator for the size of a banking institution.  
Table 8- Auditor's Information per year 
Audit firm  Median audit fee per year (€ mil) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Deloitte and Touche 8,4 8,0 9,0 9,0 8,5 8,1 9,6 9,4 11,1 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 5,0 6,0 5,6 5,2 5,0 3,1 3,8 5,8 5,5 
KPMG 9,4 8,6 7,4 6,9 7,1 5,3 5,1 5,5 5,2 
Ernst & Young 11,9 12,3 11,2 9,1 9,1 7,5 8,7 12,3 7,7 
Other (Mazars,  
Crowe Horwath 
International and other 
firms) 
11,1 12,2 13,6 13,5 12,2 17,4 23,3 26,1 11,7 
 
In Table 8, we dissect the median audit fee per year for each audit firm. Concerning 
the amount of audit fees, non-Big 4 companies had charged higher audit fees through 
the years compared to Big 4 auditors. We can explain this taking into consideration the 
above table 7, banks with greater assets may pay higher audit fees. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers has the lowest amount of audit fees. The same is applied for 
KPMG, which has a decreasing amount of audit fees over the years.  
3.4. Variables correlation 
The first level is to investigate the correlation among the explanatory variables in order 
to investigate if two variables have a linear relationship. A correlation matrix is the tool 
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to examine and detect multicollinearity in a multiple regression model. We run the 
correlation matrix (Table 9) in Stata statistical program. The indication 1.0000 means 
that the variables are perfect positive correlated. When the value is from -1.0 to -0.5 or 
from 1.0 to 0.5 there is a strong correlation negative or positive respectively, from -0.5 
to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5 there is a moderate correlation, from -0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3 
there is weak correlation and from -0.1 to 0.1 it is considered to have none or very 
weak correlation. 
Table 9- Explanatory Variables Correlation matrix 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1.logass 1.0000             
2.big4 -0.2123 1.0000            
3.piigcs -0.0564 -0.1337 1.0000           
4.carratio -0.0426 -0.0719 0.3697 1.0000          
5.intang -0.4198 -0.1270 -0.0567 0.0775 1.0000         
6.nonperf -0.0216 -0.0963 -0.4051 -0.1384 0.0373 1.0000        
7.efficien -0.2293 -0.0313 0.0876 -0.0564 0.4662 -0.0886 1.0000       
8.roa 0.2061 -0.2468 -0.1577 -0.5221 -0.0341 -0.0685 0.0015 1.0000      
9.liabass 0.0469 0.2270 0.2010 0.2651 -0.0285 -0.0777 -0.0372 -0.0760 1.0000     
10.grgdp 0.0348 -0.1871 0.0380 -0.1885 0.2122 -0.2095 0.0741 0.3598 -0.0879 1.0000    
11.infl 0.1560 -0.0939 -0.1166 -0.4388 -0.1373 -0.2350 -0.0756 0.7793 0.0485 0.1654 1.0000   
12.provllos 0.2510 -0.2201 -0.0017 -0.2781 0.0162 -0.2284 0.0640 0.8188 -0.0341 0.4055 0.6092 1.0000  
13._cons -0.6567 -0.0925 -0.2755 -0.4443 0.2654 0.1402 0.1792 0.0308 -0.6684 0.0633 -0.0199 -0.1395 1.0000 
 
Generally, it is not observed strong correlation among the independent variables. 
Negative correlation is detected for intangible assets/ total assets and the logarithm of 
total assets, which means that an increase in one variable will cause a decrease in the 
other, but it is not significant, and it can be considered moderate. The same is 
detected for non-performing loans/ total loans and Piigcs and for carratio and Piigcs. 
Moderate negative relationship also exists between roa and carratio, carratio and 
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inflation rate. Moderate positive relationship exists between efficiency and intangibles, 
inflation and provisions for loan losses, provision of loan losses and growth of GDP, 
inflation and roa. The higher positive correlation is (0,8188) between the provision for 
loan losses/ total loans and Roa. The other variables could be considered to have weak 
correlation. There is no significant linear relationship between the explanatory 
variables. Thus, there is no need to make changes concerning the variables, because it 
is not observed verified multicollinearity of high importance. The constitution of the 
correlation Matrix is enough satisfactory, so we can move on without removing any of 
them. 
3.5. Econometric approach and empirical results  
3.5.1. Model 1 
The first model is based on specifications commonly used in the audit fee literature. 
Audit fees are regressed on measures of institutions size, auditors’ size, capital risk, 
credit risk, liquidity risk and operating risk, which are all risks closely related to the 
banking industry.  
The form of the model 1 is as follows:  
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑜 + 𝑎1 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎4 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎5 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (1) 
Where: i = 1, 2… 91 and denote the bank 
 t = 1, 2… 9 and denote the year  
 a0 is a constant and εit represents the residual (error) 
As regards the dependent variable in equation (1), LOGFEE represents the natural 
logarithm of the audit fee. Concerning the independent variables of the model, 
LOGASS represents the natural logarithm of total assets. BIG4 denotes a dummy 
variable, which takes the number 1 if the bank institution is audited by one of the Big4 
audit firms, otherwise it takes the number 0. Previous studies have supported that the 
coefficients α1 and α2 of LOGASS and BIG4 are expected to have a positive value. 
Capital risk is measured by CARRATIO, which represents the capital adequacy ratio. 
The α3 coefficient is expected to be positive, because an increased value of CARRATIO 
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is an indication for higher pressure from regulatory authorities. Other main measure 
for the capital risk is INTANG. Similarly, the coefficient α4, for the second measure 
related to capital risk, should be positive. Higher level of intangible assets indicates the 
possibility of a more intricate and risk-taking banking institution. Furthermore, banks 
regulatory capital is reduced from goodwill. As a result, there is bigger capital risk and 
the need of higher audit exertion for banks with acquisition activity. Credit risk is 
related with the percent of non-performing loans to total loans. There is a positive 
relationship between audit fees and non-performing loans. The greater the amount of 
non-performing exposures the greater the risk of a client not to repay the loan, so the 
audit fees are higher. Thus, the α5 coefficient is expected to be positive. Last but not 
least, the efficiency ratio is related with the effectiveness of the banks management. 
High operational risk indicates ineffective management and bad decisions. So, we 
expect a negative α6 coefficient because less efficient institutions have higher audit 
fees.  
Moving to the next step, the regression estimation of our panel data, and before the 
initial results we had to decide whether to use the fixed effects method (FE) or the 
random effects method (RE) (error components model). Generally, FE model is 
preferable when the sample entities compose the entire population. RE model is more 
convenient when the sample entities can be though as having been randomly selected 
from the population.  
In order to choose between the two different methods, we run the regression two 
times, one with the FE method and another with the RE method. Afterwards, we 
conducted the Hausman test in Stata statistical program, which assess if a statistical 
model reciprocates to the data. The hypothesis of the test is depicted in table 10.   
Table 10- Hausman test Hypothesis 
 H0 is true H1 is true 
B (RE estimator) Consistent efficient  Inconsistent  
b (FE estimator) Consistent inefficient  Consistent  
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In Table 11 are presenting the results of the Hausman test. In the second column are 
presenting the estimated coefficients of the Fixed effects methods, in the third column 
are depicted the estimated coefficients of the Random effects model and in the fourth 
column is estimated their difference.  
Table 11- Results of Hausman Test, model 1 
 Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b - B) Sqrt (diag (V_b -
V_B)) S. E. 
Logass 0,5768023 0,7867297 -0,2099274 0,1374079 
Carratio -0,0002527 0,0001244 -0,000377 0,0017218 
Intang -0,0003358 0,0023326 -0,0026683 0,0024315 
Nonperfloans 0,0024313 0,0020203 0,000411 0,0007969 
Efficiency -8,84e-07 -2,88e-07 -5,95e-07 3,55e-07 
 
Prob > chi2= 0,3633 
So, because the p- value 0,3633 > 0,05 we don’t reject the null hypothesis, thus 
Random Effects is the appropriate method.  
Furthermore, we check the existence of heteroscedasticity which is a major problem in 
the regression analysis. When there is heteroscedasticity the scatter of the errors 
varies depending on the value of one or more of the explanatory variables. The 
conducted test, in Stata, pointed out that there was heteroscedasticity and corrective 
action has been taken to ensure homoscedasticity.  
Autocorrelation is another issue that should be tested in a regression analysis. It is the 
resemblance between a given time series and a lagged version of itself over 
consecutive time intervals. In essence, it gauges the connection between a variable’s 
current and past value. Autocorrelation was detected and corrective actions were 
made, using Stata statistical program. 
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Table 12- Results of model 1 
Variable  Expected sign Coefficient 
estimate 
Z P – value 
Intercept  - 3,8856 24,74 0,000** 
LOGASS + 0,7867 25,81 0,000** 
BIG4 + 0,5068 8,13 0,000** 
CARRATIO + 0,0001 0,03 0,977** 
INTANG + 0,0023 1,89 0,058** 
NONPERFORMLOANS + 0,0020 0,72 0,468** 
EFFICIENCY - 2,88e-07 0,13 0,896** 
Adjusted R- square % 0,83    
*** is for 1% level of significance, ** is for 5% level of significance and * for 10% significance 
level. 
In the Table 12 are presenting the initial results regarding model 1. The results show 
that the coefficients on the determinants of audit fees have the expected sign. But for 
the 6 controls, only the 2 are statistically significant (p- value < 0,05) and one is 
marginally statistically significant for a 95 % confidence interval (or a threshold of 5 %). 
The natural logarithm of total assets is significant with a positive sign, which means 
that for a bank with higher assets (greater client size) an auditor will ask higher fees. 
This is confirmed also by the audit literature; all major studies (Fields, Fraser & Wilkins, 
2004) had examined the impact of total assets and had concluded to the same results. 
Furthermore, Big4 is statistically significant with a positive sign. This means that a Big4 
audit firm will charge higher fees from a client. So, the size of the auditee also matters. 
Intangible assets/ total assets are marginally statistically significant with positive 
direction. The explanation is that auditors charge higher audit fees for banking 
institutions with a history of mergers and acquisitions. The other 3 determinants are 
not statistically significant, which means that do not affect the audit expenditures. So, 
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operating, credit and one liquidity measure do not affect European banks audit fees. 
Finally, the adjusted R- square is enough satisfying, meaning that the model is good.  
3.5.2. Model 2  
The second model is similar to the first model with an extra dummy variable. This 
indicator variable will give more gravity to PIIGCS banks. The form of the model is as 
follows:  
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑜 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡
+  𝑎5 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7 𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                 (2) 
Where: i = 1, 2… 91 and denote the bank 
  t = 1, 2… 9 and denote the year  
a0 is a constant and εit represents the residual (error) 
In (2) equation, the dependent variable, LOGFEE, represents the natural logarithm of 
the audit fee. Respecting the independent variables, the meanings and coefficients are 
the same with those in equation (1). But, we have an extra dummy variable which 
takes the number 1 if the bank operates to an economy of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain or Cyprus, and takes the number 0 otherwise. The coefficient α7 is 
expected to be positive. Because we are expecting higher audit fees in PIIGCS banks 
due to the financial crisis and the higher risks that those banks undertake.  
As in the model 1, the Hausman test was used so as to make a selection between the 
Fixed effects and Random effects method. The Hypothesis of the test is the same with 
table and the results are presenting in table 13.  
Table 13- Results of Hausman Test, model 2 
 Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b - B) Sqrt (diag (V_b -
V_B)) S. E. 
Logass 0,5768023 0,7870532 -0,2102509 0,1372543 
Carratio -0,0002527 0,0000711 -0,0003237 0,0015999 
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Intang -0,0003358 0,002327 -0,0026627 0,0024177 
Nonperfloans 0,0024313 0,0020546 0,0003766 0,0006642 
Efficiency -8,84e-07 -2,89e-07 -5,94e-07 3,52e-07 
 
Prob > chi2= 0,3621 
So, because the p- value 0,3621 > 0,05 we don’t reject the null hypothesis, thus 
Random Effects is again the appropriate method for the regression.  
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation were detected and corrected for the regression 
of the model 2. Thus, the initial results, using the random effects method, are 
presenting in the table 18.  
Table 14- Results of model 2 
Variable  Expected sign Coefficient 
estimate 
Z P – value 
Intercept  - 3,8851 24,70 0,000** 
LOGASS + 0,7870 26,16 0,000** 
BIG4 + 0,5071 8,08 0,000** 
PIIGCS - 0,0046 0,08 0,940** 
CARRATIO + 0,0001 0,02 0,987** 
INTANG + 0,0023 1,88 0,060** 
NONPERFORMLOANS + 0,0020 0,70 0,485** 
EFFICIENCY - 2,89e-07 0,13 0,896** 
Adjusted R- square % 0,83    
*** is for 1% level of significance, ** is for 5% level of significance and * for 10% significance 
level. 
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In the second model the extra variable is only one. For the 6 same determinants with 
the model 1 the results are the same. Assets, Big4 and Intangibles/ total assets 
(marginally) are statistically important for a 95 % confidence interval. For our extra 
dummy variable, Piigcs, the concluding remark is that it is not statistically significant 
(0,940 > 0,05). The tenor is that audit fees are not driven by the country (if it is a Piigcs 
country or not). The general economic situation of country, due to the crisis, is not a 
determinant of audit fees. The same controls (assets etc.) are important for the level of 
audit fees for all the European banks and there no different pattern for Piigcs financial 
institutions. The adjusted R- square is adequate for our model.   
3.5.3. Model 3  
The third model is the biggest one with 5 extra independent variables. The form of the 
model is as follows:  
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑜 + 𝑎1 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎5 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7 𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎8 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎9 𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎10 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝑎11 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎12 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (3) 
Where: i = 1, 2, …., 91 and denote the bank 
 t = 1, 2, …., 9 and denote the year  
 a0 is a constant and εit represents the residual (error) 
In equation (3), we have the same explained variable, LOGFEE, which denotes the 
natural logarithm of audit fee. We have the same 7 explanatory variables with model 
2. So, the expected relationship between them and the explained variable and the 
coefficients expected sign is the same. The coefficient α8 of ROA is expected to be 
positive. ROA is an indicator of the profitability of the bank, thus the higher the 
generation of profits the higher the paid amount of audit fees. When LIABASSETS have 
higher value it means that liabilities are more than assets, thus the bank has more 
obligations than requirements. As a result, we are expecting a positive α9 coefficient 
due to the fact that a higher LIABASSETS ratio means higher bank risk and higher audit 
fees charge from audit firms. The next two variables signify some macroeconomic 
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factors and are related with the financial situation of the country in which the bank 
operates. GROWTHGDPs coefficient, α10, is anticipated to have a positive value. 
Countries with higher growth of GDP are healthier and are growing faster, so the paid 
audit fees are higher. But if we see it from another perspective, the coefficient could 
be either negative. In a country with recession the banks have to deal with more risks, 
so the auditor may impose higher audit fees due to the excess risk. As regards the 
inflation rate, higher inflation rate leads to rising prices for goods and services. Thus, 
we expected a positive α11 coefficient which denotes the relationship between audit 
fees and inflation rate. The last variable is PROVLLOSSES, we anticipate positive 
relationship between provision for loan losses/ total loans and audit fees. When a bank 
forecast to have many loan losses the credit risk is higher and so the audit fees.  
As in the previous models, the Hausman test was used so as to make a selection 
between the Fixed effects and Random effects method. The Hypothesis of the test is 
the same with table. In table 20, we depict the Stata results of the conducted Hausman 
test.  
Table 15- Results of Hausman Test, model 3 
 Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b - B) Sqrt (diag (V_b -
V_B)) S. E. 
Logass 0,5817714 0,8033824 -0,221611 0,1362532 
Carratio -0,0016293 0,0002179 -0,0018472 0,0019034 
Intang 0,0001752 0,0028652 -0,00269 0,0024162 
Nonperfloans -0,0014292 -0,0010133 -0,0004159 0,0009273 
Efficiency -5,79e-07 -6,54e-07 -6,45e-07 3,60e-07 
Roa 0,01268 0,0157802 -0,0031002 0,0060036 
Liabassets -0,8329264 0,1479705 -0,980897 0,7179374 
Growthgdp 0,0079477 0,0082252 -0,0002774 0,0007903 
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Infl -0,0576967 -0,0332635 -0,0244332 0,0283442 
Provllosses 0,0571003 0,0571745 -0,0000742 0,0044582 
 
Prob > chi2= 0,1184 
So, because the p- value 0,1184 > 0,05 we don’t reject the null hypothesis, thus 
Random Effects is again the appropriate method.  
The next step was to detect the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
and make corrective actions for the regression of the model 2. Thus, using the random 
effects method the initial results are reporting in Table 16.   
Table 16- Results of model 3 
Variable  Expected sign Coefficient 
estimate 
Z P – value 
Intercept  - 4,1566 21,82 0,000** 
LOGASS + 0,8033 29,31 0,000** 
BIG4 + 0,5042 8,55 0,000** 
PIIGCS + 0,0037 0,06 0,949** 
CARRATIO + 0,0002 0,04 0,965** 
INTANG + 0,0028 2,36 0,018** 
NONPERFORMLOANS - 0,0010 0,35 0,728** 
EFFICIENCY + 6,54e-07 0,03 0,976** 
ROA + 0,0157 0,89 0,374** 
LIABASSETS + 0,1479 1,67 0,095** 
GROWTHGDP + 0,0082 2,11 0,035** 
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INFL - 0,0332 0,36 0,715** 
PROVLLOSSES + 0,0571 2,16 0,031** 
Adjusted R- square % 0,84    
*** is for 1% level of significance, ** is for 5% level of significance and * for 10% significance 
level. 
The table 16, with the results of model 3 reveals that at the 95 % confidence interval 
LOGASS, BIG4 and INTANG are statistically important and with the expected sign 
according to the literature (Fields, Fraser & Wilkins, 2004). In this model, are added 5 
more determinants as we deemed it appropriate to deepen and broaden our research. 
Concerning these controls, GROWTHGDP, which is a macroeconomic factor, is 
statistically significant and the audit fees are driven by it. Initially, there was a doubt 
about growths of GDP expected sign. From one point of view, we expected a positive 
sign because it makes sense auditors charge more fee to healthier countries and lower 
the price to countries in recession due to the continuous lowering of wages and prices. 
But for another point of view, a negative relationship was valid because audit firms 
could charge more the banks which are located in countries with economic 
fluctuations and deal with higher risks. The results from Stata show that the higher the 
growth of GDP the higher the audit fees. So, auditors take into consideration the 
financial situation of a country when they audit a bank. Furthermore, provisions for 
loan losses is an important determinant. The greater the ratio provisions for loan 
losses/ total loan the higher the audit price because the high ratio it’s an indicator for 
increasing credit and liquidity risk. For a 90 % confidence interval (a 10 % threshold) 
LIABASSETS could be considered to have a significant relation with audit fees. The 
more liabilities and the fewer assets a bank has the more audit fees will charge the 
auditor because the liquidity risk is growing. Audit fees are not driven by profitability 
measures as ROA (0,374 > 0,05). Also, they are not affected by the inflation rate, which 
is not statistically significant.       
To summarize and evaluate critically the results, PIIGCS banks and non PIIGCS banks 
determinants are behaving in the same way during crisis. Our first hypothesis was that 
there would be a different pattern because of the different way, dimension and extent 
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each of the country was affected from crisis. But, from the moment we began 
processing the data it turned out that this is not the case. If we had examined a 
different period, before and after crisis, maybe the conclusions would be different. 
Furthermore, the determinants of audit fees, which are statistically significant, are 
total assets, if an audit firm is Big4 or not, the intangible assets/total assets, the growth 
of GDP, the ratio liabilities/assets and the provision of loan losses/ total loans. These 
results are consistent with our initial hypothesis, expectations and the relative 
literature (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo, 2010). 
4. Conclusions, limitations and recommendations for future 
research  
 
This is the last chapter, in which are presenting the concluding remarks resulting from 
our analysis, the limitations that might have and possible issues that worth to be 
examined in the future. 
Our thesis, intends to show the fundamental factors which contribute to the pricing of 
European banks, in the middle of the economic crisis, by audit firms. Also, examines if 
there is a different audit pricing for PIIGCS countries banks due to the excess 
difficulties that these countries face. In this context, there were used 3 models with an 
increasing number of determinants. This way, gave us the allowance to study the 
whole sample, European banks, in relation with prior literature. At a second level, to 
make a diversification and study if there is a different impact in PIIGCS banks. And at 
last, to investigate some hypothesis dependent on our worries and questions. As a 
consequence, the general audit fee model is examined broader and into an alternative 
perspective.  
The results demonstrate that auditors charge more the banks with greater assets, 
more intangible assets, higher ratio of total liabilities to total assets and more 
provisions for loan losses. So generally, the areas that are of a high importance for 
regulatory agencies with respect to the fees, as capital, liquidity and credit risk, have a 
consistency with the study.  
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Concerning the auditor, the size does matter. Big4 firms charge higher fees as a 
premium for their services. Furthermore, the pricing is not affected only by factors of 
the banking industry. The macroeconomic factors of the country and the level of the 
health regarding its economics are taken into consideration by audit firms. We found 
that it does not make sense if a country is a PIIGCS one or not, but this is in conflict 
with the results regarding the growth of GDP. This may be due to the examined years 
(2008-2016, in the middle of the crisis) and the financial situation of each country. For 
instance, a Piigcs country which was in a great recession will have a high growth of 
GDP when the financial starts getting better. So, there are coming up limitations which 
could be interesting to be dealt with in more detail and in different ways in the future. 
For this reason, a future study can examine the determinants of audit fees in PIIGCS 
countries prior and post crisis. Also, a deeper investigation about macroeconomic 
factors, their fluctuations and the relationship between them and audit pricing is an 
upcoming issue for audit fee literature.  
Last but not least, general conclusions and recommendations about the audit industry 
could be drawn. The way that auditors are pricing can be studied in order to avoid 
downsizing. An alignment of processes between internal and external auditors will 
strengthen preparedness in front of an underlying new crisis. 
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